Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc Respondent\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 43863 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-12-2016
Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc Respondent's
Brief 2 Dckt. 43863
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc Respondent's Brief 2 Dckt. 43863" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6172.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6172
Kenneth L. Mallea ISB No. 2397 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Fax: (208) 888-2789 
Email: klm@mallealaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 




ST A TE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 43863 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-
APPELLANT INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S 
BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF IDAHO 
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant 
Riek D. Kallas 
I 031 E. Park Blvd 
Boise. Idaho 83712 
(208) 345-8945 
rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
Chairman, R.D. Maynard, Presiding 
Attorney for Emplover-Respondcnt 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-5454 
jmb@elamburke.com 
Attorney for ISIF-Respondent 
Kenneth L. Mallca 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian. Idaho 83680-0857 
(208) 888-2790 
klm@mallcalaw.com 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S BRIEF - I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... 3 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................... 5 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................................................................... 5 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below ............................................................................ 6 
C. Statement of the Facts .............................................................................................. 7 
IL ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL. ................................... 7 
III. CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 8 
A. Industrial Commission Jurisdiction Limited ........................................................... 8 
B. Industrial Commission Order of Approval Final.. ................................................. 10 
C. JRP 15 Cannot Create Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 14 
IV. ISIF RESPONSE TO MR. DA VIS' APPEAL ............................................................ 19 
A. The Industrial Commission Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Case No. 2005-
501080 ................................................................................................................... 19 
B. Idaho Code §72-318 and Wernecke Do Not Support Claimant's Appeal ............. 21 
C. Corgatelli Decision Not Applicable to ISIF ......................................................... 22 
D. The Stipulation for Entry of Award, and Order of Approval Clearly Delineate 
the ISIF Liability .................................................................................................... 25 
E. ISIF Liability Clear Under Stipulation and Order ................................................. 26 
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 29 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S BRIEF 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 686 P .2d 54 ( 1984) ..... 22, 23, 25 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 (2014) .. 6, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 
24,28 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686 at 691,864 P.2d 132 at 137 (1993) ................................. 9, 17 
Davidson v. HH Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986) ........................... 10, 12 
Deon v. H & J, Inc. and ISIF, 157 Idaho 665, 339 P.3d 550 (2014 ..................................... 9 
Drake v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.2d 397 
(1996) ............................................................................................................................. l 1 
Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005) ....................................... 21 
Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co. and Industrial Indemnity Co., 112 Idaho 291, 732 P.2d 260 
(1986) ............................................................................................................................. 12 
Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Util. Com 'n, 102 Idaho 744,639 P.2d 442 (1981) .. 8, 17 
in re Wright, 148 Idaho 542,224 P.3d 1131 (2010) ............................................................ 9 
Morris v. Hap Taylor and Sons, Inc. and Liberty Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 633, 301 P.3d 639 
(2013) ............................................................................................................................. 12 
Owsley v. Idaho Indust. Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 134, 106 P.3d 455,460 (2005) .............. 20 
Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9,644 P.2d 331 (1982) ............................................................. 10 
State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985) ........................................................... 18 
State v. Grose Close, 67 Idaho 71, 171 P.2d 863 (l 946) ................................................... 18 
Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572,691 P.2d 1187 (1984) ................................. 18 
Wernecke v. St. Mary's Joint School District No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008 
(2009) ....................................................................................................................... 20, 21 
Statutes 
§67-2402 .............................................................................................................................. 8 
§67-5201(2) ......................................................................................................................... 8 
§72-318 .................................................................................................................. 20, 21, 28 
§72-318(2) ................................................................................................................... 20, 21 
§72-332 .............................................................................................................................. 22 
§72-408 .......................................................................................................................... 5, 11 
§72-409 .......................................................................................................................... 5, 11 
§72-508 ................................................................................................................................ 9 
§72-707 .............................................................................................................................. 19 
§72-711 ........................................................................................................................ 10, 11 
§72-718 ...................................................................................... 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 26 
§72-719 ........................................................................................................................ 10, 13 
§72-735 .............................................................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Constitution Art. IV, §20 ........................................................................................... 8 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S BRIEF - 3 
Rules 
JRP 15 .............................................................................. . 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 
Other Authorities 
Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an 
Unruly Horse, 1988 BYU L. Rev. I (1988) ................................................................... 20 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S BRIEF - 4 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a worker's compensation case in which the Claimant, the Employer/Surety 
and the ISIF entered into a compensation agreement styled as the Stipulation for Entry of 
Award Against Defendants (R. pp.18-29). Prior to signature by the parties and counsel, 
the compensation agreement was provided to Claimant for review and approval. The 
language, content, and benefits provided for in the compensation agreement were 
negotiated terms on which Claimant and Claimant's counsel had a full and complete 
opportunity to review, consider, and request amendments. In fact, prior to the final 
compensation agreement, Claimant's counsel did request certain changes to the 
document, which were made. Upon review and acceptance, the compensation agreement 
was then signed by Claimant and by Claimant's counsel. 
The Stipulation for Entry of A ward Against Defendants was reviewed and 
approved by the Idaho Industrial Commission on June 26, 2014. Upon approval, the 
Employer/Surety began making payments as called for in the agreement and the ISIF 
began to make its agreed upon payment to Claimant in the amount of the "differential", 
equal to the difference between the Employer/Surety's obligation at 55% of the average 
state weekly wage for the year of injury (2004) and the 45% benefit rate due Claimant 
under LC. §72-408 and §72-409. All of these payment obligations and liabilities to the 
Defendants were fully and completely set forth within the compensation agreement and 
approved by the Industrial Commission. The Claimant did not challenge or seek 
reconsideration of the Order of Approval and likewise did not appeal to this Court. 
Eight months after the Industrial Commission entered its Order of Approval and 
Discharge, Claimant filed his Petition for Declaratory Ruling (R. pp.13-17), seeking to 
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amend, modify and reform the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge to claim 
additional benefits, not provided for in the compensation agreement The asserted 
premise for Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling was this Court's decision in 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014). 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below. 
Following the filing of Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling, the ISIF filed a 
Limited Appearance to challenge subject matter jurisdiction and service of process. The 
ISIF maintained in its response that the Industrial Commission lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Declaratory Ruling on its merits and contended 
that all matters related to Claimant's claim for benefits arising out of his 2004 industrial 
injury, and all benefits related to any pre-existing conditions, were fully and finally 
determined by the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge and that neither the 
agreement nor the Commission's Order could be modified as requested by Claimant to 
seek additional income benefits not provided for in the compensation agreement (R. 
pp.76-81). The Employer likewise filed its objection and response to Claimant's Petition 
for Declaratory Ruling (R. pp.69-75). 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order on the Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling on October 6, 2015 (R. pp.99-112). The Commission concluded that the parties' 
Stipulation for Entry of Award, and the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge 
thereon, were not susceptible to collateral attack by Claimant under any theory advanced 
by the Claimant (or any other theory). The Commission noted that its June 26, 2014 
Order dismissed Petitioner's Complaint with prejudice. Because no Motion to 
Reconsider had been filed, and no appeal had been taken to this Court, the Order of 
Approval and Discharge was final and conclusive as to all matters relating to Claimant's 
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benefits. Claimant then filed a Motion for Reconsideration (R. pp.131-133). The 
Defendants responded to the Motion for Reconsideration, and the Industrial Commission 
entered its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on November 
2014 (R. pp.138-142). 
The Claimant then filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court, and the ISIF filed its 
Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
The only facts which are presented to this Court in this record arise out of the 
Stipulation for Entry of Award. The majority of the Claimant's version of "Statement of 
the Facts" in Appellant's Opening Brief (pp.7-11) have no relationship to any "facts" and 
instead present Claimant's legal theories and arguments in hopes of avoiding the clear 
and unambiguous language of the compensation agreement and somehow seeking 
modification of the Industrial Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge. The facts 
as are relevant to the pending appeal and cross-appeal are discussed below in ISIF 
argument. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL. 
A. Whether the Industrial Commission had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed in this case? 
B. Does a party have the right by application of JRP 15, to directly appeal a 
ruling in a subsequent proceeding with the same parties and issues that were previously 
dismissed with prejudice? 
C. Does JRP 15, as applied in this case, violate LC. §72-718? 
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III. CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENT. 
A. Industrial Commission Jurisdiction Limited. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission is an executive and administrative agency of the 
Executive Department of the state. Idaho Constitution Art. IV, §20. This constitutional 
section limits the executive agencies to no more than 20 separate agencies. The Idaho 
Industrial Commission is one of the agencies as provided in Idaho Code §67-2402. 
Although Art. IV, §20 limits the state legislature to the creation of 20 executive agencies, 
the Industrial Commission is entirely the creation of the legislature and has no 
constitutional dimension or constitutional power. Unlike the constitutional officers 
recognized in Art. IV, §20 the Industrial Commission's powers and duties arise purely by 
statute and not in any way, shape or form from the Idaho Constitution. The constitutional 
officers recognized in Art. IV, §20 are the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Secretary of State, State Controller, State Treasurer, Attorney General and Superintendent 
of Public Instruction. These seven constitutional officers fall outside the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act's definition of agency when exercising constitutional 
powers, including (but not limited to) making rules and determining contested cases. These 
seven constitutional officers, in the exercise of their constitutional powers, are not subject 
to the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act's provisions governing agencies. Idaho Code 
§67-5201(2). 
This Court has consistently held that administrative agencies of the state, including 
the Idaho Industrial Commission, have no jurisdiction, power, or authority other than that 
which is expressly given to them by the legislature. The Court in Idaho Power Co. v. 
Idaho Public Util. Com 'n, 102 Idaho 744, 639 P.2d 442 (1981 ), held and stated as follows: 
(4) Because the Commission was created by statute, the Commission has no 
jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has specifically granted to 
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it. Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai Environmental Alliance, 99 
Idaho 875, 879, 591 P.2d 122, 126 (1979). Accord, United States v. Utah 
Power & Light Company, 98 Idaho 665, 570 P.2d 1353 (1977); Lemhi Tel. 
Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 98 Idaho 692, 571 P.2d 753 (1977). 
The Commission therefore exercises limited jurisdiction, with nothing being 
presumed in favor of its jurisdiction. Id. As the court stated in Washington 
Water Power Company, supra, 
Id at Idaho p.750. 
"[a]s as general rule, administrative authorities are tribunals oflimited 
jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the statutes 
reposing power in them and they cannot confer it upon themselves, 
although they may determine whether they have it. If the provisions of 
the statutes are not met and compliance is not had with the statutes, no 
jurisdiction exists." (Emphasis added.) 99 Idaho at 879, 591 P.2d at 
126. 
In the case of in re Wright, 148 Idaho 542, 224 P .3d 1131 (2010) the Court 
reiterated that "an administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and 
authority granted it by the legislature ( citations omitted)", 148 Idaho at 548. With respect 
to the Industrial Commission itself, this Court has held that: "As a creature of legislative 
invention, the Commission may only act pursuant to an enumerated power, whether it be 
directly statutory or based upon rules and regulations properly issued by the Commission 
under Idaho Code §72-508". Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686 at 691, 864 P.2d 132 at 137 
(1993). The Court further identified the Commission's jurisdiction as follows: "The 
Commission has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has specifically 
granted to it. The Commission therefore exercises limited jurisdiction, with nothing being 
presumed in favor of its jurisdiction. (citation omitted.)", 124 Idaho at 690, 864 P.2d at 
136. See also Deon v. H & J, Inc. and ISIF, 157 Idaho 665, 339 P.3d 550 (2014) where the 
Court noted that "the Commission derives its authority solely from statutory law and does 
not have the ability to operate in the equitable realm." 157 Idaho at 669. 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT !NDUSTRJAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S BRIEF - 9 
In its adjudication of cases filed against Employers and Sureties and/or the ISIF for 
benefits, the Commission must proceed in accordance with statutory law. The statutory 
law both enables and limits the Industrial Commission in the adjudicatory process. 
B. Industrial Commission Order of Approval Final. 
The Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants (R. 1 through 12) was 
approved by the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2014. The Order of Approval and 
Discharge is found at R. p.11. The Commission Order approved the Stipulation for Entry 
of Award Against Defendants and dismissed the Claimant's case with prejudice. 
Under Idaho Code § 72-711, a compensation agreement between the Claimant and 
Employer/Surety, and also between a Claimant and the ISIF, upon approval by the 
Industrial Commission, "shall for all purposes be an award by the Commission and be 
enforceable under the provisions of §72-735, unless modified as provided in §72-719." 
Under Idaho Code §72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be 
final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the Commission, unless any party filed 
for reconsideration before the Commission or appealed the final decision to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
Idaho case law has consistently held that Idaho Code §72-711 and §72-718 provide 
that upon approval by the Industrial Commission of a compensation agreement, such 
approval is final and conclusive as to all matters related to benefits payable for the 
industrial injury. Davidson v. HH Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986), Sines 
v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9,644 P.2d 331 (1982). 
As of June 26, 2014, all of Mr. Davis' claims against Employer/Surety and the ISIF 
for benefits arising out of the industrial injury and all pre-existing conditions were fully and 
finally determined. No Motion for Reconsideration, as provided in Idaho Code §72-718, 
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was filed. Likewise, no appeal from the Commission's Order of Approval was taken to this 
Court. Consequently, the June 2014 Order of Approval was final and conclusive as to all 
matters presented in Industrial Commission proceeding No. 2005- 501080. 
The instant appeal against the ISIF is governed by this Court's decision in Drake v. 
State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 128 Idaho 880,920 P.2d 397 (1996). In 
Drake, the ISIF and the Claimant entered into an agreement whereby the ISIF agreed to pay 
Claimant "monthly benefits at the statutory rate." The agreement recited Claimant's actual 
wage at the time of the accident and provided that the agreement fully and finally disposed 
of any and all claims of any kind and character Claimant had or may have known that he 
had or may have had against the ISIF. Due to the Claimant's very low actual wage, his 
benefit rate under Idaho Code §72-408 and §72-409 was at the statutory minimum of 45% 
of the prevailing average weekly state wage. A year and a half after the agreement was 
entered into and approved by the Commission, the Claimant filed a "Petition for 
Determination of Correct Permanent Disability Rate and Request for Hearing", arguing that 
the ISIF was not paying at the correct rate and that instead a higher rate was payable and 
should be ordered. This Court summarized the factual and procedural background on 
appeal as follows: 
"The Commission found that the disability rate had been fully adjudicated 
by way of the Agreement's compromise and settlement. Because the 
Agreement constituted a final decision of the Commission, Drake should 
have sought review of the disability rate contained within the Agreement 
through a motion for reconsideration or rehearing. As a result, the 
Commission held that Drake's failure to do so barred any further 
proceedings. Drake appealed." 
Id at p.881, 920 P.2d at 398. 
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In its opinion, the Court cited to prior case law and stated that: 
Id. at p.882. 
"A liable party and an injured employee are permitted to enter into a 
settlement with regard to compensation, but the agreement must be 
approved by the Commission. I.C. §72-711. Upon approval, the agreement 
is for all purposes considered to be an award by the Commission. Id The 
approved agreement constitutes a final decision of the Commission which is 
subject to a motion for reconsideration or rehearing pursuant to LC. §72-
718. Davidson v. HH Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 760, 718 P.2d 1196, 1198 
(1986)." 
The Court noted that the compensation agreement's recitation of the hourly wage 
and the rate to be paid was approved by the Commission. If the Claimant believed, at some 
later date, that his hourly wage had been incorrectly recited, or that the benefit rate was too 
low, such issue had to have been raised by way of a Motion for Reconsideration or 
Rehearing. The Court held that: 
Id at 882. 
"Drake's failure to do so prohibits further proceedings concerning the 
correct permanent disability rate under the Agreement." 
Accordingly, the Court held that the Industrial Commission was correct in 
dismissing Claimant's Petition for correcting or modifying the award. The ISIF 
respectfully suggests that the Industrial Commission in this appeal should likewise have 
summarily dismissed the Petitioner for Declaratory Ruling as a back door attempt to 
amend, modify and reform the Stipulation for Entry of Award and the Order of Approval. 
After the time to file a Motion for Reconsideration, or the time to take an appeal from the 
Order of Approval of June 26, 2014 had expired, any further proceedings to correct, amend, 
modify or reform the agreement were prohibited. As the Court held in Drake: The 
Claimant's failure to challenge the agreement's terms and provisions related to his benefits 
"prohibits further proceedings." See also ~Morris v. Hap Taylor and Sons, Inc. and Liberty 
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Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 633,301 P.3d 639 (2013): decision of the Commission approving 
Compensation Agreement is "final and conclusive" absent proof of fraud. And Harmon v. 
's Const. and Industrial Indemnity Co., 112 Idaho 291, 732 P.2d 260 986): 
"It is clear that all claims regarding disability (as affected by both medical 
and non-medical factors) were fully settled by the agreement and fully 
adjudicated when the agreement was approved by the Industrial 
Commission. Therefore, pursuant to LC. §72-718, the lump sum agreement 
may not be modified by the Industrial Commission, absent allegations and 
proof of fraud by Mr. Harmon." 
Id. at p.295, P.2d at p. 264. 
As of June 26, 2014, any and all claims for benefits as against Employer/Surety and 
the ISIF were fully and finally determined, and a final and conclusive adjudication of all 
claims for benefits was entered. The Industrial Commission lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain and consider issues raised in the Petition for Rehearing. 
In the Stipulation for Entry of Award and approval thereof, it is abundantly clear 
that Mr. Davis' claims for benefits, including benefits for total and permanent disability, 
were fully agreed to and determined by the Commission. Absent a viable claim under §72-
719 for fraud, and filed within five years of the date of injury (which expired in 2009), 
there is simply no statutory authority or jurisdiction for this Commission to reopen or 
revisit the disability income benefits clearly provided for in the agreement. There is no 
statute authorizing the Commission to exert continuing jurisdiction over a matter which had 
been fully and finally determined. Under Idaho Code §72-718, and the decisions of this 
Court, it is clear that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
Claimant's benefits for impairment and disability under the Idaho Workers Compensation 
Law. 
In its Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling the Industrial Commission did 
affirmatively state that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain revision of the 
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compensation agreement which had been approved by final decision and order of the 
Commission. (RP 109-110)1 In this declaration the Commission was manifestly correct. 
However, the Commission then went on to entertain and consider Claimant's fall back 
argument that the ISIF obligation for full statutory benefits somehow commenced prior to 
250 weeks after October 1, 2013. Despite the Commission's recognition that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to allow attack upon, or modification of, the final and approved 
agreement, it then proceeded to review the issue on its merits. The ISIF suggests that the 
Commission recognized that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Petition 
but that it then felt obliged to consider the arguments presented under Corgatelli for 
retroactive application and for some accelerated date of the ISIF agreed upon and ordered 
date ofliability. The Commission's consideration of the issues presented in Claimant's 
Petition was perhaps intended to be of service to the parties and perhaps useful to this Court 
on appeal, but the Commission's recognition that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
this proceeding should have ended further analysis or discussion. 
The Petition for Declaratory Ruling should have been summarily dismissed by the 
Commission for failure of subject matter jurisdiction. It was error for the Commission to 
proceed to consider the petition on its merits or to consider and dispose of the arguments 
raised therein. 
C. JRP 15 Cannot Create Jurisdiction. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission has adopted JRP 15 governing declaratory 
rulings. The rule in its entirety provides as follows: 
i Note however that the declaration by the Commission that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling was qualified: the Commission elsewhere stated that: "Assuming that the 
Commission has continuing jurisdiction over the LSSA, an 'actual' controversy between Petition and the 
other parties to the LSSA appears to exist since Petitioner may net a larger recovery depending on how the 
controversy is resolved." (R. p. l O 1) 




The Commission provides this format for rulings on the construction, validity, or 
applicability of any workers' compensation statute, rule, or order. 
B. "Person" Defined. 
The word "person" whenever used in this rule, shall be construed to mean any 
person, partnership, governmental agency or department, unincorporated association or 
society, or other corporation of any character whatsoever. Such a person shall be the 
petitioner in the proceeding. 
C. Contents of Petition. 
Whenever any person has an actual controversy over the construction, validity or 
applicability of a statute, rule, or order, that person may file a written petition with the 
Commission, subject to the following requirements: 
1. The petitioner must expressly seek a declaratory ruling and must identify 
the statute, rule, or order on which a ruling is requested and state the issue 
or issues to be decided; 
2. The petitioner must allege that an actual controversy exists over the 
construction, validity or applicability of the statute, rule, or order and must 
state with specificity the nature of the controversy; 
3. The petitioner must have an interest which is directly affected by the 
statute, rule, or order in which a ruling is requested and must plainly state 
that interest in the petition; and 
4. The petition shall be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth all 
relevant facts and law in support thereof. 
D. Service on Parties. 
The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on all other persons to the actual 
controversy at the time the petition is filed with the Commission. All persons so served 
shall be deemed parties to the declaratory ruling proceeding. A declaratory ruling shall 
not be binding on persons not made parties to the proceeding. 
E. Time for Responses or Replies. 
Within 14 days after service of a petition, any party served may file a written 
response thereto, stating with specificity the facts and the law on which the responding 
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party relies. Within 10 days after service of the response, the petitioner may file a reply. 
The Commission may shorten or extend the time for filing a response or reply upon the 
filing of a motion and a showing of good cause; made within the original time allowed. 
All such responses or replies shall be served on all other parties. 
F. Disposition of Petition. 
On receipt of a petition and after the time for filing all responses and replies has 
passed, the Commission may: 
1. On motion of any party, or on its m:vn motion, hold a hearing on the facts 
and/or law; 
2. Conduct such investigation or inquiry as it deems proper, or call for a 
submission of such facts, evidence, or information as it deems necessary 
to enable it to make a determination of the issue or issues; 
3. Issue a written ruling which shall have the force and effect of a final order 
or judgment; or 
4. Decline to make a ruling when: 
a. The Commission lacks jurisdiction over the issue or issues 
presented; 
b. There is no actual controversy; 
c. The petitioner would not be directly affected by a resolution of the 
issue presented; 
d. The petitioner does not provide sufficient facts or other 
information on which the Commission may base a ruling; 
e. The issue on which a determination is sought is or should be the 
subject of other administrative or civil litigation or appeal; or 
f. It appears to the Commission that there is other good cause why a 
declaratory ruling should not be made. 
As the Court will note, JRP 15 purports to give the Commission authority to 
resolve "an actual controversy over the construction, validity or applicability of a statute, 
rule, or order ... " (JRP 15 C.). The rule does not in any way limit the Commission's 
purported authority over an "order" no matter how long ago any such order may have 
been entered. Nor does the rule as written limit the Commission's authority in a case that 
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had been fully and finally determined and that was final and conclusive as to all matters 
raised in such case in accordance with Idaho Code § 72-718. At the time Mr. Davis' 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling was filed, the ISIF filed a responsive memorandum 
suggesting that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issues and 
matters asserted in the Petition, and that the Petition should have been summarily 
dismissed. JRP 15, subsection F. 4.a. specifically affords to the Commission authority to 
decline to make a ruling when: "the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the issue or 
issues presented ... ". 
As set forth above in this brief, the ISIF respectfully maintains that the Industrial 
Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain, consider, or rule upon the 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling. JRP 15, in purporting to allow the Commission to rule 
upon any controversy involving any order, regardless of when such order was entered, 
violates Idaho Code §72-718. JRP 15, as applied in this case, violates the Commission's 
statutory mandate and cannot be said to confer subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling. 
In the Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Util. Com 'n, supra, this Court considered 
a challenge to the IPUC's authority to promulgate certain rules related to attorney's fees 
and costs. In reviewing the rules governing attorney's fees and costs in consumer 
intervenor proceedings, the Court held that the general rule making power of the 
Commission did not extend to rules governing attorney's fees and costs, and the Court 
held that such rules violated the enabling legislation and therefore the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. 
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As noted in the Curr v. Curr decision, supra, in determining the authority and 
jurisdiction of an agency, the Court will closely view the enabling statute and will 
presume nothing in favor of an agency's jurisdiction. 
In applying Idaho Code §72-718 to the pending appeal, this Court has consistently 
held that: 
"In construing legislative acts it is not the business of the court to deal in 
any subtle refinements of the legislation, but our duty is to ascertain, if 
possible, from a reading of the whole act, and amendments thereto, the 
purpose and intent of the legislature and give force and effect thereto." 
State v. Grose Close, 67 Idaho 71, 171 P.2d 863 (1946) 
The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. State v. Ankney, 109 
Idaho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985); Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572, 691 P.2d 
1187 (1984). 
In reviewing JRP 15, it is clear that the rule, perhaps unintentionally, purports to 
afford unto the Commission jurisdiction over controversies relating to "orders" regardless 
of whether or not such orders have become final and conclusive under I.C. §72-718 or 
whether such orders are beyond any applicable statute of limitations. To give effect to 
JRP 15 as applied in this case, the Court would ignore the clear and unequivocal language 
of Idaho Code §72-718 which provides finality to the Order of Approval entered in this 
case in June 2014. The Commission cannot boot strap itself into jurisdiction in 
contravention of the clear and unequivocal language of the enabling statute. 
As an alternative to ruling that JRP 15, as applied in this case, violates Idaho Code 
§72-718, the Court could determine that the Commission was simply in error in proceeding 
to consider the merits under JRP 15. As the Court will note, JRP 15, at Section 4.a. affords 
to the Commission the authority to decline to make a ruling in a case when the Commission 
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lacks jurisdiction over the issue or issues presented. As an alternative to the subject matter 
jurisdiction argument under JRP 15, the ISIF would likewise maintain that the Commission 
was in error in proceeding to entertain the Petition for Declaratory Ruling on its merits. 
The ISIF maintains that the case had been fully and finally adjudicated in June of 2014 
without appeal or reconsideration. As such, there was no continuing jurisdiction over the 
Claimant's case, and JRP 15 could not and does not revive a concluded case simply by 
including the term "ruling" in JRP 15 C. 
IV. ISIF RESPONSE TO MR. DA VIS' APPEAL. 
A. The Industrial Commission Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Case 
No. 2005-501080. 
The Appellant in this case seeks retroactive application of this Court's decision in 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 (2014) to modify and reform 
a final and conclusive Order of the Industrial Commission. The device being attempted 
by Claimant is to collaterally attack the Commission's Order by way of a challenge to the 
Commission's subject matter jurisdiction. The device fails and the Claimant's efforts to 
challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in underlying case No. 2005-
501080 likewise must fail. 
Idaho Code Title 72, Chapter 7 lays out the "procedures" governing proceedings 
before the Industrial Commission. Under Idaho Code §72-707 all questions arising under 
Title 72, "if not settled by agreement or stipulation of the interested parties with the 
approval of the Commission," except as otherwise herein provided, shall be determined 
by the Commission. The issues of Claimant's benefits against the Employer/Surety and 
the ISIF were "settled by agreement or stipulation of the interested parties with the 
approval of the commission." Furthermore, the proviso in § 72-707 which confers 
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jurisdiction to the Commission except as otherwise herein provided includes the finality 
statute of Idaho Code § 72-718. Likewise, this Court has held that: "Generally, the 
Commission's jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating certain complaints filed by a 
worker's compensation Claimant against an employer or an employer's surety." Owsley 
v. Idaho Jndust. Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 134, 106 P.3d 455,460 (2005) (Emphasis 
omitted). In Case No. 2005-501080, there was no attack on the Commission's subject 
matter jurisdiction. Of course not, as there was no Motion for Reconsideration and there 
was no direct appeal to this Court. Only after the Claimant's counsel awakened to the 
Court's decision in Corgatelli was the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed, some eight 
months after the Commission's Order of Approval dating from June 2014. And to add 
additional confusion and procedural error, Claimant used the same case number as was 
used in the underlying case, which was fully settled and final by Order of Approval, in 
the Petition for Declaratory Ruling; this in an effort to show that somehow the underlying 
case was still pending or that the Commission still had jurisdiction. 
It is clear that the Industrial Commission had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
complaints filed in the underlying case. The parties stipulated and agreed to the benefits 
as set forth in the Stipulation for Entry of Award and as approved by the Industrial 
Commission on June 26, 2014. The Commission was not deprived of subject matter 
jurisdiction by virtue of a subsequently issued opinion by this Court and the Commission 
had full jurisdiction and authority to approve the parties' compensation agreement. 
The Claimant's attempt, by way of collateral attack to the Commission's subject 
matter jurisdiction by the vehicle of the Petition for Declaratory Ruling, fails. Alleged 
error of a lower court or of an administrative agency does not deprive the tribunal of 
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subject matter jurisdiction. See Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a 
New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 BYU Rev.1 (1988). 
B. Idaho Code §72-318 and Wernecke Do Not Support Claimant's 
Appeal. 
Claimant argues that the Commission's Order of Approval dated June 26, 2014 is 
void under Idaho Code §72-318(2), which provides that no agreement by an employee to 
waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid. As correctly stated by the 
Commission in its Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Idaho Code §72-318 does 
not authorize Claimant's collateral attack on the compensation agreement. The 
Commission properly noted that, with respect to the ISIF, the compensation agreement 
was valid in that it provided compensation for the past injury at issue in the case, and that 
it provided for statutory benefits to Claimant to begin at a future date. With respect to the 
Employer and Surety, the Commission properly noted that the compensation agreement 
involved a past injury, which is a kind and type of agreement "all together appropriate 
under Idaho Code §72-318." 
The Commission discussed the Court's opinion in Wernecke v. St. Mary's Joint 
School District No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008 (2009). The Commission 
correctly noted that the compensation agreement clearly recited the essential elements of 
ISIF liability and in fact discharged that liability at a point in time 250 weeks from the 
date Claimant reached MMI. Moreover, as the Commission correctly noted, this Court 
held in Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005): an agreement and 
Stipulation for Dismissal with prejudice, of a past industrial injury, even with no 
compensation paid, is not void under Idaho Code § 72-318. 
The compensation agreement entered into between the parties in this case and the 
Order of the Industrial Commission approving the agreement, is not subject to attack 
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under Idaho Code §72-318(2) or under the Wernecke decision of this Court. The ISIF 
proceeded in full accordance with the mandates of Wernecke in entering into the 
Stipulation for Entry of Award. Mr. Davis bargained for and received, from the ISIF, full 
statutory disability income benefits beginning at a date 250 weeks from MMI. In return, 
and as approved by this Court, he did waive any and all future claims, known or 
unknown, or claims which might relate to any future industrial accidents or injuries. But 
he did not waive any claims for the past or pending claim in the underlying case. 
Moreover, in approving the Stipulation for Entry of Award, the Commission was able to 
review the Stipulation and conclude that the elements and requirements of Wernecke had 
been fully met. 
In negotiating and executing the Stipulation for Entry of A ward, the Claimant did 
not "waive" any benefit. Rather, he bargained for the benefits (and the credit to Surety) 
as set forth in the Stipulation and as approved by the Commission. The agreement settled 
and compromised a long pending case dating from the industrial injury occurring on 
November 9, 2004. The compensation agreement and the Commission's Order 
determined the benefits payable to Claimant and Claimant released any and all other 
claims of any kind or nature against the Defendants. The compensation agreement and 
Order of Approval fully concluded this case and Claimant's attempts to bootstrap himself 
into additional benefits by way of his Petition for Declaratory Ruling should be rejected. 
C. Corgatelli Decision Not Applicable to ISIF. 
Appellant spends considerable argument in support of the retroactive application 
of this Court's decision in Corgatelli, supra. Insofar as that decision addressed 
permanent physical impairment benefits which may be payable to a Claimant, it is self-
evident that the case is entirely inapplicable to any liability of the ISIF under Idaho Code 
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§72-332. By definition, permanent partial impairment is solely the duty and liability of 
the Employer and Surety. The ISIF, on the other hand, is liable only for its apportioned 
share of any total and permanent disability held by this Court in Carey v. Clearwater 
County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984). As the Industrial Commission 
noted in some detail in its Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling (R. pp.103-105), the 
Carey decision apportioned only non-medical factor disability and did not require that the 
Employer and Surety in the three cases pay permanent partial physical impairment a 
second time. Thus in Carey, the Employer and Surety was given a credit against total 
disability obligations for permanent partial impairment which had been previously paid. 
The parties in negotiating and agreeing to the Stipulation for Entry of Award 
proceeded in accordance with the Court's holding in Carey, supra, and as the 
Commission specifically noted in its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. pp.138-142): 
"As the Commission went to some lengths to explain in the Order on 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, it is implicit in the landmark decision of 
Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 
(1984) that the type of credit at issue in this case, is not only allowed, but 
anticipated by the apportionment scheme adopted by the court in that 
decision." 
(R. p.141) 
The Commission declined to apply the Court's decision in Corgatelli, supra, 
retroactively in this case or to relieve Claimant from the clear and unambiguous terms of 
the Stipulation for Entry of Award. The Commission further noted, with regard to 
retroactive application, that: 
"nor has Petitioner cited the Commission to any authority which would 
support the retroactive application of the Corgatelli Court's construction 
of the statutory scheme. Finally, it is possible the Corgatelli Court did not 
intend a broad interpretation that the Commission has given to that case. 
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For this reason as well, we decline to apply it in the fashion urged by 
Petitioner, without receiving further direction from the Court." 
(R. p.141) 
Although the Court's decision in Corgatelli regarding permanent partial 
impairment benefits is not applicable to the ISIF, mention must be made of Appellant's 
insinuations that the Defendants were somehow prescient of the as yet unreleased Court's 
ruling in Corgatelli. Appellant's Brief states the following: 
"In this case, the Employer and the ISIF cannot argue in good faith that 
they relied on the validity of the Industrial commission's ruling in 
Corgatelli when they inserted the invalid PPI credit into paragraphs 11 
and 12 of the compensation agreement in June of 2014 because the 
Defendants in this case were the same Defendants in Corgatelli and knew 
that the Claimant in Corgatelli was challenging the validity of the PPI 
credit on appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court when they slipped the 
invalid PPI credit into paragraphs 11 and 12 of the compensation 
agreement." 
(Appellant's Opening Brief p. 28) 
The suggestion is made that the Defendants "inserted the invalid PPI credit" and 
"slipped the invalid PPI credit" into the negotiated and agreed upon compensation 
agreement because the Defendant State Insurance Fund and ISIF were parties to 
Corgatelli. So Claimant seeks retroactive application of a case because two parties in 
this case somehow knew what the Idaho Supreme Court would do in the Corgatelli case? 
Whatever abilities (and however limited) or experience undersigned counsel may 
possess, prescience of this Court's rulings is not among them. The Claimant's attempt to 
have the Corgatelli ruling made retroactive in this case as against the Employer and 
Surety is built on quicksand. 
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D. The Stipulation for Entry of Award, and Order of Approval Clearly 
Delineate the ISIF Liability. 
Nor can it be said that the Defendants "slipped" any term or provision into the 
compensation agreement. On the contrary, the agreement was negotiated and drafted, 
and provided to Claimant's counsel for review and requested changes. Following 
Claimant's counsel's review of the draft Stipulation, he requested certain changes and 
they were made. Such changes are not in the record, but the Stipulation was certainly 
fully executed by Mr. Davis and by Mr. Kallas in his role as counsel. At no time prior to 
execution of the Stipulation did Claimant's counsel object to the clear and unambiguous 
obligation for benefits to be paid by Defendants, nor was any objection made to the now 
alleged "invalid credit" to Employer/Surety for prior permanent partial impairment 
benefits paid. 
As the Court will note in reviewing the Stipulation, this case presented a wide 
range of physician impairment ratings both for pre-existing impairments and for the 
industrial injury. Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation reflected the wide range of impairments 
which had been assigned by various physicians over the course of time. (R. p.4 18). In 
Paragraph 10 of the Stipulation, the Defendants and the Claimant agreed that 
Employer/Surety would be responsible for 250 weeks of total and permanent disability 
income benefits commencing as of Claimant's MMI date, October 1, 2013. (R. pp. 4-5, 
110) 
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation recited the apportioned liability to the 
Surety and the Surety's responsibility for payment of disability income benefits in the 
amount of 55% of the average state weekly wage for the year of injury (2004). The 
agreement then provided that the ISIF liability would commence for the differential 
( difference between the prevailing average weekly wage for 2013 and thereafter and the 
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Surety's responsibility for 55% of the average state weekly wage for the year of injury). 
See Carey v. Clearwater County, supra, holding that a Surety's obligation in a total and 
permanent disability case was to pay 55% of the average state weekly wage effect 
the year of injury. This "differential" obligation of the ISIF, which has been paid 
monthly in accordance with the agreement, will continue to be paid according to the 
agreement until 250 weeks from the MMI date of October 1, 2013. At the expiration of 
said 250 week period, the agreement provided that the ISIF would pay Claimant his full 
statutory income benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly wage until 
Claimant's death. Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation recognized Surety's prior paid 
impairment of 27% whole person and that Surety had advance 5% whole person benefits 
against a future determination of permanent disability. Those combined benefits equaled 
a total of 160 weeks of Employer/Surety obligation in the total and permanent disability 
case. This credit was applied to the obligation of the Surety and clearly recited that the 
Surety would then have a responsibility for 90 weeks of benefits upon approval of the 
Industrial Commission. 
The credit to the Surety for impairment and total and permanent disability benefits 
advanced was in full accord with existing Industrial Commission decisions and long 
standing practice. This credit was agreed to by the Claimant and the document was 
approved and executed by Claimant's counsel. The Claimant's current attempt to 
modify, amend and reform the agreement is contrary to the plain language of the 
agreement and contrary to all concepts of finality required under Idaho Code §72-718. 
E. ISIF Liability Clear Under Stipulation and Order. 
As noted above, the Stipulation for Entry of Award clearly establishes the liability 
for the ISIF to pay statutory income benefits at the rate of 45% of the prevailing average 
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state weekly wage. As clearly set forth in Paragraph 11 of the Stipulation, and as noted 
above, the prevailing rate of 45% of the average state weekly wage as of October 2013 
and thereafter exceeded the benefit rate payable by Employer/Surety in the amount of 
55% of the average state weekly wage for 2004, the year of the industrial injury. 
Therefore, the ISIF carefully recited its obligation for the differential and reflected that 
amount in Paragraph 11 as 9.60 per week for the remainder of 2013. For the calendar 
year 2014, the agreement provided that the ISIF shall be obligated to pay Claimant the 
differential amount of 14 .10 per week. At the expiration of the app011ioned 250 week 
period of disability to Employer/Surety, the ISIF will begin paying Claimant his full 
statutory income benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average state 
weekly wage until Claimant's death. 
Although the ISIF maintains that the Industrial Commission should not have 
reached the merits of Claimant's arguments regarding ISIF liability, it is certainly clear 
that the Industrial Commission properly analyzed Claimant's arguments and rejected 
each and every one of them. In answer to Claimant's contention that the Stipulation for 
Entry of Award was "ambiguous", the Commission stated that: 
"We find that the LSSA is not ambiguous, and that the responsibility of 
the ISIF to assume exclusive responsibility for the payment of statutory 
benefits for total and permanent disability does not begin until after the 
expiration of 250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013." 
(R. p.110) 
The Commission further stated that: 
"Paragraph 11 of the LSSA clearly contemplates that despite whatever 
credit may be taken by the Employer, ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of 
Petitioner's statutory benefits does not commence until the expiration of 
250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013." 
(R. p.111) 
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In response to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, the ISIF explicated the 
credit issue as being grounded in the ISIF liability for any differential payable in a total 
and permanent disability case where the Surety is responsible for 55% of the actual state 
wage in effect for the year of injury and the ISIF is responsible for benefits payable at the 
then prevailing average state weekly wage. In this case the ISIF liability for the 
differential was fully recited in the agreement as a per week obligation. In no way can 
the Stipulation for Entry of Award be construed in the tortured manner sought by 
Claimant. The phrase "subject to" merely provided that even though the 
Employer/Surety would not be making payments for the 160 week period reflecting 
benefits it had already paid, the ISIF was nevertheless obligated to and would continue to 
pay the "differential" up to the expiration of Surety's apportioned 250 weeks 
responsibility for total and permanent disability. 
Eight months after the Industrial Commission's Order of Approval, the Claimant 
attempted to rewrite the compensation agreement. The Claimant somehow wants to 
retain all benefits clearly provided for in the compensation agreement, and also be 
awarded additional benefits, not bargained for and not provided for in the agreement, by 
retroactive application of Corgatelli or by virtue of Idaho Code §72-318, or by virtue of a 
tortured argument regarding ISIF liability. The Stipulation for Entry of Award was 
negotiated and bargained for between and among all parties. The Defendants may not be 
relieved of the liabilities clearly provided for, and likewise the Claimant may not increase 
the benefits bargained for and provided in the Stipulation. 
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V. CONCLUSION. 
The Petition for Declaratory Ruling should have been summarily denied by the 
Industrial Commission for the failure, as a matter of law, of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Alternatively, it was an error for the Commission to entertain the Petition on the merits 
under JRP 15. F. 4(a). Finally, the Order of the Industrial Commission denying the 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling correctly disposed of the Petition in concluding that the 
June 2014 Order of Approval and Discharge was a final and conclusive determination of 
any and all claims for benefits Claimant had against the Employer/Surety and the ISIF. 
Dated: May /2,2016. 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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